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Riegger: Legal Profession

Legal Profession
by William J. Riegger*
During 1967, the California courts made decisions dealing
with admission to the bar, discipline, the statute of limitations
in legal malpractice, and just compensation. The legislature
also affected the legal profession by expanding the power of
local government to employ private counsel, 1 by changing the
rules governing admission of out-of-state attorneys to the bar,2
and by changing certain fee provisions. s

* B.S.L. 1948, J.D. 1950, University
of Minnesota. Professor and Assistant
Dean, University of San Francisco
School of Law. Member, Arizona and
Minnesota State Bars.
The author extends his appreciation
to Miss Sandra Wruck, second year
student at Golden Gate College, School
of Law, for assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See Cal. Water Code § 71758; Cal.
Ed. Code § 1016.5.

2. § 6062 of the Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code was amended to add the provision
that an applicant "may demonstrate to
the satisfaction of the examining committee that his experience and qualifications qualify him to take an examination." This allows applicants an alternative to the previous requirement of
spending four of the previous six years
in the practice of law in another state.
3. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 284.
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The California Supreme Court decided several important
bar admission cases. In Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners4 and March v. Committee of Bar Examiners,5 the Committee of Bar Examiners made value judgments and, in effect,
by refusing certification, attempted to punish past conduct
of the applicants.
In Hallinan the committee refused to certify petitioner who
had graduated from an accredited California law school and
had passed the California Bar examination. The committee
found petitioner did not possess the good moral character
necessary for admission, since he had been convicted of such
misdemeanors as unlawful assembly, trespass to obstruct lawful business, and unlawful entry, all in connection with civil
disobedience. Also noted and discussed by the court was the
petitioner's proclivity for settling disputes with fisticuffs. The
court noted that out of nine incidents, six were "youthful indiscretions," and that the three most recent fights were satisfactorily explained.
The court indicated that the state bar did not have a right
to judge an applicant's philosophy. Hallinan had told the
commission that he advocated extralegal means (such as
peaceful sit-ins) to achieve a desired end if, and only if, all
legal means had been unsuccessfully exhausted. The court
held that if it were to deny the right to enter a licensed profession to every person who had engaged in a sit-in or other form
of non-violent civil disobedience, it would deprive the community of the services of many highly qualified persons of the
highest moral courage. It further held that the committee
could not consider past actions of an applicant unless those
actions had a direct bearing on the applicant's moral qualifications to practice law. The court found that Hallinan's acts
were not necessarily incompatible with the truthfulness, faithfulness, and integrity required to practice law. The issue as
stated by the court was not whether the petitioner's conduct
should be condoned, but whether the conduct exhibited should
deny him admission to practice. Based upon this reasoning,
4. 65 CaI.2d 447, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228,
421 P.2d 76 (1966).
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5. 67 Cal.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 399,
433 P.2d 191 (1967).
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the court held that Hallinan should be admitted to the California Bar, thereby reversing the action of the committee.
In reaching its conclusion the court blurred a distinction
that it had previously made between application for admission
and disciplinary proceedings. In the case of In re Wells,6
it had been held that the court could refuse admission even
if the proof of conduct found would not be sufficient cause
for disbarment. In Hallinan, although the court admitted
that there may be some distinctions between refusal of admission and disbarment, it held that "insofar as the scope of
inquiry is concerned, the distinction between admission and
disciplinary proceedings is today more apparent than rea1. m
The court further stated that in admission proceedings, as
in disciplinary proceedings, the court must examine and
weigh the evidence, and pass upon its sufficiency, resolving
any reasonable doubts in favor of the accused. The court
stated that:
Fundamentally, the question involved in both situations
is the same-is the applicant for admission or the attorney sought to be disciplined a fit and proper person to
be permitted to practice law, and that usually turns upon
whether he has committed or is likely to continue to
commit acts of moral turpitude. At the time of oral
argument the attorney for respondent frankly conceded
that the test for admission and for discipline is and should
be the same. We agree with this concession. s
In March, the California Supreme Court also reversed the
committee's refusal to certify the petitioner. The petitioner
had testified falsely under oath before the Dies Committee,
the former House Committee on Un-American Activities.
Subsequently, he had made numerous false statements, not
under oath, to a union trial committee, and in a later appeal,
to executives of the union. The Committee of Bar Examiners
made clear that March not only had committed these acts,
but also had not mentioned them either on his registration
6. 174 Cal. 467, 163 P. 657 (1917).
7. 65 Cal.2d at 452, 55 Cal. Rptr. at
233, 421 P.2d at 81.

8. 65 Cal.2d at 453, 55 Cal. Rptr. at
233, 421 P.2d at 81.
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form as a law student or on his application for examination
and admission to practice law. Petitioner March admitted
the false testimony, but said that his attendance at law school
had effected a change in his outlook. In dealing with the
allegation of omissions in the registration forms, the court
noted that the petitioner had stated therein that he was a
former member of the Young Communist League and the
Communist Party, that he had been summoned before the
Dies Committee in 1939, and that he had been before the
union on charges of being a communist.
"While it is true that he did not state unequivocally he
had made false statements on the occasions in question,
his answers on the application, when viewed as a whole,
establish that he was not guilty of deliberate concealment."9
The court avoided the basic question of whether petitioner's
false statements before the Dies Committee and in the union
proceedings should justify the conclusion that he was not a
fit person to practice law. It determined that since petitioner
had convincingly demonstrated his rehabilitation, it was not
necessary to decide whether the prior acts constituted moral
turpitude. As in Hallinan, the court stressed the great weight
to be given to recommendations written on petitioner's behalf
by an unusually large number of attorneys. As was stated in
Hallinan "[T]he law looks with favor upon rewarding, with
the opportunity to serve, one who had achieved 'reformation
and regeneration.' mo
A third situation involving admission to practice law was
adjudicated in Chaney v. State Bar.n This case dealt with
a rather unique test of the committee's power. An applicant
for admission to the bar had twice failed the examination
and then brought suit in the United States District Court
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,12 seeking an injunction
and damages for lack of certification. Chaney named the
9. 67 Cal.2d at 743, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
407, 433 P.2d at 199.
10. 65 Cal.2d at 462, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 239, 421 P.2d at 87.
416

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/17

11. 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. [1967]).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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state bar, members of its Board of Governors, and members
of its Committee of Bar Examiners as defendants. Appellant
contended that the essay type of examination was fundamentally unfair and that it was used "to control competition"
since only about one-half of those taking the examination
passed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's dismissal. Because the failure to pass an essay
type of examination was not a deprivation of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the applicant had no cause of action under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The court indicated that California had a right to require
high standards of qualification for admission to its bar, so
long as the standards were equal and fair. The court further
held that, under California law, the Committee of Bar Examiners merely acts as an instrumentality of the California Supreme Court for the purpose of assisting in matters of admission, and that only the California Supreme Court has authority to permit an applicant to practice law. The court reiterated that it would look into any situation where an applicant
could show that the committee had failed him on the bar
examination because of fraud, imposition, or coercion. However, since no appeal along these lines had been made through
the state courts, the matter was not ripe for federal action.
We turn next to traditional concepts of disciplinary proceedings: contempt and disbarment. In Miller v. Municipal
Court/ 3 the court of appeal reversed a contempt conviction.
It held that a deputy public defender was not in direct contempt for failing to appear in the courtroom at a designated
time as a consultant to a defendant, who was appearing in
propria persona. The deputy's delay had not left the defendant in court without a legal adviser, since another deputy
public defender was present. The deputy against whom the
contempt proceedings were brought had been delayed because,
at the public defender's request, he had been attending to
other matters connected with the defendant's case. Care had
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 531, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 578 (1967).
27
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been taken to notify the judge that the deputy would be late.
The court distinguished this case from Lyons v. Superior
Court14 and Arthur v. Superior Court/ 5 where the failure of
the respective attorneys to appear had made it impossible
for the trials to continue, and where the court had not been
advised in either case that the attorney would not be present.
In Vaughn v. Municipal Court/ 6 also decided this year,
counsel was held in contempt both for misrepresentation of
facts to the court in a successful attempt to obtain a continuance in a criminal trial, and for failing to appear at the ordered
time of the continuance. Vaughn had informed the court
that a continuance of his Los Angeles appearance was required because he had a trial in another city on that day;
in fact he had no such trial. Vaughn then failed to appear
on the new date. The court reiterated from Miller that willful
failure to appear at a trial at the appointed time constitutes
direct contempt. Regarding the element of misrepresentation,
the court stated the "conduct denounced . . . is not the
act of an attorney by which he successfully misleads the court,
but the presentation of a statement of fact, known by him
to be false, which tends to do SO.,,17 The court, in rejecting
the attorney's exception to the failure of the judge to disqualify
himself, stated that with the commission of a direct contempt,
the judge in whose presence the contempt is committed has
the constitutional power to punish the offender summarily,
since the necessities of the case will require that the affronted
judge preside. Furthermore, the court, in summarily rejecting the attorney's claim that due process was violated by failure to inform him of his constitutional rights under Escobedd 8
and Dorado/ 9 stated:
How can an experienced lawyer, under these circumstances, who considered himself well enough qualified
14. 43 Cal.2d 755, 278 P.2d 681
(1955).
15. 62 Cal.2d 404, 42 Cal. Rptr. 441,
398 P.2d 777 (1965).
16. 252 Cal. App.2d 348, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1967).
418
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17. 252 Cal. App.2d at 358, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 581.
18. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758
(1964).
19. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965).
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to represent literally hundreds of persons charged with
a variety of serious felonies (murder, burglary, assault
with a deadly weapon . . .) now, in good faith, make
the claim that . . . he did not know of his constitutional rights.20

It was also pointed out that the attorney had had ample
opportunity to obtain counsel for himself, and that he had
elected not to do so.
In the three disciplinary proceedings for misappropriation
in 1967, the court meted out punishment ranging from suspension from practice and probation to disbarment. In In re
Urias, 1 counsel had been convicted of grand larceny. Urias
was not disbarred, because consideration was given to his
subsequent rehabilitation from the alcoholism which had
caused the financial hardship under which he had operated at
the time of the theft.
Although extenuating circumstances were taken into consideration in Urias,2 nevertheless, in Simmons v. State Bar3
the court reiterated that misappropriation of funds entrusted
to an attorney is a serious breach of professional ethics and
morality, and is deserving of disbarment in the absence of
extenuating and mitigating circumstances. Failing to find
such extenuating or mitigating circumstances in this case, the
court upheld a two-year suspension recommended by the State
Bar.
In Grove v. State Bar,4 two proceedings, one for suspension
and one for disbarment, were consolidated for hearing. The
court determined that petitioner should be disbarred, and did
not consider the suspension. Grove had been charged not
only with taking money from clients, but with nonperformance
20. 252 Cal. App.2d at 365-366, 60
Cal. Rptr. at 586.
1. 65 Cal.2d 258, 53 Cal. Rptr. 881,
418 P.2d 849 (1966).
2. "Prior to 1955 petitioner's conviction of grand theft would have resulted
in automatic disbarment (Stats. 1939,
ch. 34, p. 357), and the vast majority of
grand theft convictions of attorneys

since that date have resulted in disbarment or resignation with prejudice." 65
Cal.2d at 262, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 883, n. 5,
418 P.2d at 851, n. 5 (1966).
3. 65 Cal.2d 281, 54 Cal. Rptr. 97,
419 P.2d 161 (1966).
4. 66 Cal.2d 680, 58 Cal. Rptr. 564,
427 P.2d 164 (1967).
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of promised legal action. He had a history of allowing the
statute of limitations to run, failing to appear in court, and
failing to return documents and records of various clients.
In each instance, he had refused to answer letters and telephone calls from clients concerning these matters. The only
evidence his defense offered in mitigation was a report furnished by a psychiatrist indicating that Grove was neurotic.
The court held that although one count would not be grounds
for disbarment, the ten incidents which were before the court
indicated that his persistent failure to perform services for
which he had been engaged was willful and deliberate. Although the court appreciated the petitioner's frankness in
recognizing his problem, it felt obligated to disbar the attorney
to protect the public, and stated:
In this area our duty lies in the assurance that the
public will be protected in the performance of the high
duties of the attorney rather than in an analysis of the
reasons for his delinquency. Our primary concern must
be the fulfillment of proper professional standards, whatever the unfortunate cause, emotional or otherwise, for
the attorney's failure to do SO.5
Turning to the area of the statute of limitations involving
actions for legal malpractice, there were two cases decided
in 1967. In Fazio v. Hayhurst,6 the client, in reliance on
negligent advice of counsel, had elected to take under her
husband's will rather than to take her intestate share. The
attorney also negligently prepared and filed the order settling
the final account, wherein he listed all of the estate as separate
property rather than community property. The client thereby
lost approximately $47,000. The election was signed on
October 23, 1962, more than two years before the action for
malpractice was brought. However, the decree of distribution
was entered within the two-year period prior to the bringing
of the action. The court held that the client had not irrevocably acted upon the advice of her counsel until the final
decree of distribution was entered, inasmuch as her right to
5. 66 Cal.2d at 685, 58 Cal. Rptr. at
567, 427 P.2d at 167.
420
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370 (1966).
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change her election was preserved until that time. Thus, the
two-year statute commenced running at the time of the final
distribution, rather than at the time of the signing of the
election.
In Eckert v. Schaal,7 a group of co-adventurers purchased
property, formed a corporation, and sold the property to
the corporation at an undisclosed profit. One year and six
months after the sale had been completed, the clients were
sued by other shareholders for the undisclosed profits, and
seven months later the clients cross-complained in that action
against their attorney for malpractice in having failed to
advise them that the profits should have been disclosed to the
corporation at the time of the sale. In sustaining the demurrer
to the cross-complaint on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run, the court distinguished Fazio, since there
the election to take under the will could have been revoked
up until the time of distribution of assets of the estate, whereas
once the corporate sale in Eckert had been made at an undisclosed profit, the action could not be revoked or reversed.
A number of cases this year dealt with the problem of just
compensation for attorneys. In Estate of M orinini, 8 the court
held the granting of attorney's fees to be an abuse of discretion in the absence of a valid contest for letters of administration. In this case, decedent owned property in Monterey
County and his family resided in Switzerland. Prior to filing
his petition for letters of administration, the Public Administrator of Monterey County had contacted the surviving wife's
sister. The sister had approved of his filing the petition, but
she was subsequently requested by the decedent's wife in
Switzerland to act as administratrix and consequently filed
a petition. The public administrator was so notified, but did
not withdraw his petition. The superior court granted letters
of administration to the sister and awarded attorney's fees
to the public administrator. In holding this to be an abuse
of discretion, the court stated that employing an attorney
for a petition for letters of administration is a contract made
7. 251 Cal. App.2d 1, 58 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1967).
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in advance of any authority over the estate. Whether the
application is successful or not, in the absence of special
circumstances, the estate is not to be charged therefor.
Spencer v. Taylor 9 involved a retaining lien arising from a
divorce proceeding wherein a trust account had been created
for the husband and wife by their respective counsel. The
wife thereafter discharged her attorney and agreed that all
the money in the trust account belonged to her husband.
When the husband sought to acquire the money, the wife's
former attorney refused to release it and claimed a lien thereon for his fee. At the same time, the attorneys sought to
recover the fees directly from the wife. The main issue on
appeal was whether a common-law retaining lien existed.
While reiterating that a lien on behalf of an attorney for
fees may be created as a result of a specific agreement therefor, the court indicated that California law is unclear as to
whether a retaining lien, in fact, exists in California. 1o The
court went on to say:
In any event, we do not find it necessary to resolve the
perplexing question of whether a common-law retaining
lien exists in this state
because respondents
did not and could not acquire such a lien under the facts
of this case.
To hold that an attorney may acquire a retaining lien
. . . on property which he acquired . . . with the
duty which he voluntarily assumed as a trustee .
would be repugnant to the high professional standard
which the attorney must maintain during all phases of
litigation. . . .11
By holding that a common-law retaining lien would not apply
in this case, the court avoided determining whether such a
lien exists in California.
9. 252 Cal. App.2d 735, 60 Cal. Rptr.
747 (1967).
10. 252 Cal. App.2d at 744, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 754.
422
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McCafferty v. Gilbank 12 dealt with another aspect of liens
in California. Here the former wife of the plaintiff in a personal injury action had obtained a judgment against him for
back alimony and child support. Their respective attorneys
had entered into an agreement whereby the ex-wife was to
receive one-half of the proceeds of the plaintiff's personal injury action in settlement of her judgment. Upon its receipt by
plaintiff and his attorney, the check was cashed. No funds
were furnished to the ex-wife. In reversing a non-suit granted
in an action for conversion against the attorney, the court
held that it was the attorney's duty to see that plaintiff's
ex-wife was paid, pursuant to his agreement with her attorney,
despite the fact that there was no actual lien attached to the
funds.
An attorney's duty was discussed in Gold v. Greenwald. 13
This case dealt with duty to a long-time client who became
a business partner. Here the attorney sued the client for
termination of an oral joint venture and for an accounting.
The court ruled that although the joint venture would have
been fair between two non-lawyers, there is a presumption
of undue influence if the attorney does not advise his client
as if the client were a third party, or advise the client to seek
independent counsel. The attorney had failed to warn the
client of the dangers inherent in the joint venture and the
dangers of dealing with him. The court, in affirming the decision of the trial court, held that the joint venture was therefore
unenforceable against the defendant-client.
The court of appeal also considered the necessity of a
judge's impartiality. In the judiciary, a conflict of interest
generally results in the disqualification of the judge. 14 In
Tatum v. Southern Pacific Company,15 the judge disqualified
himself when he learned that he was trustee of 400 shares
in the defendant corporation. However, this was not until
after the liability aspect of the case had been tried. After
12.
Rptr.
13.
Rptr.
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Cal. App.2d 569, 57 Cal.
(1967).
Cal. App.2d 296, 55 Cal.
(1966).

14. The pertinent California statutes
are §§ 170 and 170a of the Cal. Code
Civ. Proc.
15. 250 Cal. App.2d 40, 58 Cal. Rptr.
238 (1967).
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verdict for the defendant, plaintiff made a motion for a new
trial on the grounds of error of law and insufficiency of the
evidence. On the motion, the lower court vacated the judgment and granted a new trial on the sole ground of disqualification. The appellate court admitted that a judgment
against defendant would have had no effect on the value of
the stock; that the judge had not been aware of his holding
of the stock before he rendered the verdict; and that no error
had been shown in the trial itself. However, under the terms
of section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure, designed to
encourage faith in the fairness of courts, the disqualification
of an interested judge is absolute; the statute is inflexible and
leaves the judge with no jurisdiction to proceed, regardless
of the degree of such interest. I6 Counsel for defendant queried
whether, if such a judgment is absolutely void and no statute
of limitations applies, the discovery of interest many years
after judgment might not cause serious problems. The court
avoided this argument by pointing out that it is based on
mere possibility and is inapplicable here. The case points
out that any act of a disqualified judge in violation of section
170 of the Code of Civil ProcedureI7 is absolutely void wherever brought in question; that consent of the parties cannot
impart validity to the proceedings; and that a party to the
action is not estopped from attacking it by the fact that
he attended the trial without raising the objection. Therefore
it is well established that, under the California rules, ownership by the judge of a single share of stock of a corporate
party to the litigation disqualifies the judge from proceeding
in the action. 18
Major developments in the matter of professional responsibility have been created outside the courts and the legislature,
at least in California, in the past year. The American Bar
16. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v.
Superior Court, 182 Cal. 315, 187 P.
1056 (1920)_
17. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 170(2)
states that "No justice or judge shall sit
or act as such in any action or proceeding . . . in which he is interested as
a holder or owner of any capital stock
424
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or other security issued by a corporation; . . ."
18. This is not so on the federal side,
as illustrated by the case of Lampert v.
HolIis Music, 105 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. N.Y.
[1952]).
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Association and the California Bar Association are giving
a hard look at the canons of ethics and rules of professional
conduct, with an eye towards specialization. The United
Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association19 case has brought
the question of group legal services before the bar and the
public once more. The neighborhood legal centers, whatever
their sponsorship, have raised questions such as who shall
control these centers and who shall decide what cases are to
be taken. The centers have been remarkably active in the
past year. Many of the cases handled by these centers have
brought a new emphasis to the legal profession in the fields
of debtor remedies, landlord-tenant, welfare, and uninsured
motorist. Out of this may come an entirely new area of
instruction in the subject of poverty law, both in the law
schools20 and by the Continuing Education of the Bar of California. It has been proposed that a group of lawyers working for the Office of Economic Opportunity legal service centers be formed into a separate staff of research attorneys whose
primary function would be to further law reform and social
change, with the neighborhood centers instructed to keep an
eye out for certain fact situations involving clients who come
to the centers.l
To end on a pleasant note, a recent article in the Wall
Street Journal stated that a certain New York law firm was
prepared to offer $15,000 per year to attorneys who have just
passed the bar. It would seem that one reason for the necessity of paying this unusually high stipend to new lawyers is
the scarcity to established law firms of available recruits
created by the number of lawyers choosing to enter such legal
aid programs as those just discussed.
19. 389 U.S. 217, 19 L.Ed.2d 426, 88
S.Ct. 353 (1967).
20. CEB Legal Ser. Gazette, Vol. I,
No. 11, p. 135.

1. CEB Legal Ser. Gazette, Vol. II,
No.3, p. 61.

•
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

425

13

